Week 2: Odd BGP routes during the Venezuela blackout, and how to read them yourself
Eight Caracas prefixes showed up behind Sparkle and GlobeNet a day before the strikes. Here's how to pull the same public BGP data and check your own routes.
Contents
December 31 to January 6. The stories people read most, then a walkthrough you can run from your own laptop with free, public data.
What people were reading
These got the most upvotes on Hacker News this week. More upvotes means more people read and talked about it.
- US strikes in Venezuela and Maduro’s capture, about 1,800 upvotes. The biggest news story of the week.
- There were BGP anomalies during the Venezuela blackout, about 940. The security story everyone shared. It’s this week’s walkthrough.
- Anna’s Archive lost its .org domain, about 670. A reminder that whoever controls your domain registrar can switch you off.
- Bluetooth headphone jacking, about 550. A talk from the Chaos Communication Congress on using headphones as a way into the phone they’re paired with.
- Finland detained a ship after an undersea cable was cut, about 510.
Not security, but people were talking about them: Apple’s new Tahoe icons, Stack Overflow’s falling question count and AWS raising GPU prices 15%.
Walkthrough: reading BGP data like the Venezuela write-up
Quick background. BGP is how networks on the internet tell each other “send traffic for these IP addresses to me.” Each network has a number, called an AS number. When a network announces a block of addresses (a prefix), the announcement carries a list of the networks it passed through, called the AS path.
Here’s what the Low Orbit Security write-up found (Radar #16):
- On January 2 around 15:40 UTC, Cloudflare Radar flagged a route leak involving CANTV (AS8048), Venezuela’s state telecom.
- Eight prefixes were seen going through CANTV with Sparkle (Italy) and GlobeNet (Colombia) in the path. All eight sit inside 200.74.224.0/20, which WHOIS lists as Dayco Telecom in Caracas.
- AS8048 showed up about ten times in a row in some paths. Repeating your own number like that, called prepending, makes a route look worse, so other networks are less likely to use it.
The write-up is careful not to claim what any of it means. What’s useful is that all of it came from public data you can query too. Everything below is read-only and touches only public datasets.
1. See what a network announces. RIPEstat is a free API from RIPE NCC. This lists the prefixes an AS announces:
curl -s "https://stat.ripe.net/data/announced-prefixes/data.json?resource=AS8048" \
| python3 -m json.tool | head -40
Swap in your own company’s AS number. You should recognize every prefix in the list. One you don’t recognize is worth a question to your network team.
2. Look at the updates around a time window. This pulls BGP announcements and withdrawals for a prefix during a two-hour window:
curl -s "https://stat.ripe.net/data/bgp-updates/data.json?resource=200.74.224.0/20&starttime=2026-01-02T15:00&endtime=2026-01-02T17:00" \
| python3 -m json.tool | less
Each update shows the AS path. Look for networks in the path that don’t belong there, and for the same AS number repeated many times.
3. Go to the raw data, the way the write-up did. RIPE’s RIS collectors save every BGP update in five-minute files. bgpdump turns them into readable lines:
sudo apt install bgpdump
wget https://data.ris.ripe.net/rrc00/2026.01/updates.20260102.1540.gz
bgpdump -m updates.20260102.1540.gz | grep "200.74.2"
Each line has a timestamp, the prefix, and the full AS path. That’s exactly where the 10x prepending in the write-up shows up.
4. Check whether your routes are protected by RPKI. RPKI lets a network publish which AS is allowed to announce its prefixes, so others can reject fakes. Check one prefix and its origin:
curl -s "https://stat.ripe.net/data/rpki-validation/data.json?resource=AS13335&prefix=1.1.1.0/24" \
| python3 -m json.tool
"status": "valid" is what you want. "unknown" means nobody published a record for that prefix, so a hijack wouldn’t be filtered. You can also see which big providers filter invalid routes at isbgpsafeyet.com. The write-up points out that Sparkle is listed there as not safe.
5. Set up an alert. For your own prefixes, a free monitor such as Cloudflare Radar’s route leak notifications or RIPE’s BGP alerting will email you when someone else announces your space.
Also this week
Your domain registrar is a single point of failure. Anna’s Archive lost its .org name after the registry suspended it (TorrentFreak). For your own domains: turn on registrar lock, use two-factor on the registrar account, and enable DNSSEC.
Undersea cables keep getting cut. Finland detained a ship and its crew after a cable between Finland and Estonia was damaged (CNN). If your service depends on one region, it’s a good week to check what your failover actually does.
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